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Abstract 
 
Transnational corporate bribery is complexly organised at a multi-jurisdictional level. However, enforcement 
remains at the local, national level where investigators and prosecutors are pressured to respond using 
frameworks for enforcement created by intergovernmental organisations. These legal frameworks are 
incorporated into national laws which results in legal convergence between jurisdictions but the ‘functional 
equivalence’ approach of intergovernmental organisations enables divergence in enforcement practices. This 
article analyses two theoretically comparable anti-corruption enforcement systems, those of the UK and 
Germany, to evidence an understanding of policy responses at the operational level. Irrespective of the 
enforcement system implemented (centralised or decentralised, use of corporate criminal liability or not, 
amongst other dimensions), enforcement faces significant structural, legal, procedural, evidential and financial 
obstacles, even where will to enforce the law is high. Consequently, criminal law enforcement is currently 
implausible.  
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Introduction 
 
Large-scale investigations involving multi-national corporations (MNCs) such as the BAE 
Systems and Siemens bribery scandals demonstrate how large commercial enterprises may 
be the subject of allegations of bribing overseas public officials to further or maintain their 
business interests.1 For example, BAE Systems are (and have been) under investigation for 
paying bribes to the Czech Republic, Romania, Qatar, Chile, Tanzania and most notably 
Saudi Arabia to secure sales of their defence equipment. Some would accept that as the cost 
of development or the unavoidable interdependence between licit and illicit commerce in 
‘grey’ markets; others would argue that corruption and bribery have devastating 
consequences, in particular for developing countries where much corporate bribery is 
directed – such activities may cause serious political, economic, social and environmental 
harms2 such as diminished economic development and growth, increased social inequality, 
and distrust of government (Delaney, 2007: 419) as well as inefficient government 
contracting and privatisations, use of delays and red tape to induce payoffs, inefficient use 
of corrupt payments, inequities in reference to the distribution of gains and losses, damaged 
political legitimacy, and slowed growth whereby the benefits of development are 
distributed unequally (Rose-Ackermann, 1997: 42-46). These moral and socio-economic 
harms have led concerned parties to focus on law enforcement and other control 
mechanisms. But criminal justice mechanisms have not proven to be easy.  
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Since the creation of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention 1997 and subsequent pressure for nation-states to 
conform, such corporate bribery in international business has been placed on the agenda of 
national governments. Sovereign states that do not have an active enforcement stance 
against transnational bribery are facing intense criticism from (i) international and 
intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD and the United Nations (UN) and (ii) 
international anti-corruption bodies including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such 
as Transparency International (TI). International measures such as the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, the UN Conventions and numerous regional (for example European Union and 
Council of Europe) level Conventions provide anti-corruption frameworks within which to 
tackle these crimes - these often incorporate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (for 
example, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the OECD Working Group on 
Bribery) to review the efficacy of national anti-bribery and corruption policies and 
enforcement practices, though serious measurement and indeed conceptual issues remain.  
However, implementing international frameworks at the national level is not 
straightforward. For example, while countries sign and ratify such international frameworks, 
some jurisdictions often possess insufficient infrastructures and resources to enforce them 
(Shover and Hochstetler, 2006: 107). State corruption may also reduce enforcement while 
powerful nations may have the ability to influence the creation of international treaties and 
therefore protect their business activities by resisting criminalisation or refusing to ratify 
treaties (Michalowski and Bitten, 2005). As business transactions become more 
transnational in nature, increased opportunities for white-collar crimes and the possibility of 
externalising risk have been created - the global marketplace also intensifies the impacts of 
white-collar crimes and risky transactions as we have seen most recently with the global 
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economic crisis and subprime mortgage lending (Gibbs et al., 2010: 544). There is no widely 
accepted nor effective transnational law making and law enforcement body or mechanism – 
in other words, business becomes global but controllers are generally constrained by 
divergent domestic rules and limited jurisdiction (Passas, 1999: 400; Braithwaite and 
Drahos, 2000). It is here that a key contradiction becomes evident: in short, national 
authorities are pressured to respond to trans-national corporate bribery using inter-national 
frameworks for enforcement that are distanced from context and the cultural and 
internal/external pressures faced at the operational level.  
These issues raise significant questions: To what extent are national enforcement 
regimes able to implement the requirements of international frameworks? What are the 
differences and similarities in the challenges and obstacles faced in different jurisdictions? 
Due to several key intellectual similarities and differences, comparative analysis of the UK 
and Germany is particularly suitable for understanding the impact of international 
frameworks for enforcement and the limits and strengths of national enforcement 
frameworks.3 First, both the UK and Germany are key economic players, both being 
members of the G8 and both having the largest share of world exports in the EU. (This is 
significant given the focus on transnational corruption). Second, since the introduction of 
the OECD Convention, Germany has concluded significantly more cases than the UK, 
although these enforcement rates have become more similar in the last three years. Third, 
the anti-corruption enforcement systems of the two jurisdictions differ in structure. The UK 
may be considered a centralised system while the German system is decentralised. Fourth, 
corporate criminal liability exists in the UK but not in Germany.  
The empirical insights and quotes in this article are taken from data collected as part 
of the author’s ESRC funded doctoral research that was completed in 2012. The findings are 
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based upon 20 semi-structured bilingual interviews primarily with UK and German 
investigators and prosecutors. In the UK, due to the centralised nature of anti-corruption 
enforcement, there is only one main state agency with national jurisdiction (excluding 
Scotland); this is the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), although other agencies provide assistance 
(see below). Investigators and prosecutors in the SFO were sampled across different levels 
of operational and strategic involvement. In Germany the anti-corruption system is 
decentralised and primary responsibility is located with regional state prosecutors and 
police, and there are no specialist anti-corruption agencies. Key state actors in two active 
Bundesländer were approached and acted as gatekeepers to prosecutorial and investigatory 
agencies and departments. Interviews with those at the operational and strategic levels 
were carried out. Interviews were also conducted with representatives of two 
intergovernmental organisations and a leading non-governmental organisation that are 
highly influential in the response to transnational corporate corruption and bribery. UK and 
German lawyers with extensive prosecutorial/defence experience of white-collar crimes and 
country specific experts were also interviewed along with extensive bilingual document 
analysis. Interviews discussed the policy responses in the two jurisdictions and at the 
international level with specific focus on detection, investigation, prosecution and 
prevention and their location within the cultural, institutional and legal contexts of both 
countries.  
The article initially analyses the most significant international enforcement 
frameworks. Here the OECD and UN Conventions are analysed and their impact at the 
national level discussed – although much convergence is evident (even though Germany is 
yet to ratify the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) – see below), significant 
differences remain. These reflect the ‘functional equivalence’ approach adopted by 
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intergovernmental organisations. However, common difficulties are faced: nation-states 
attempting to regulate the behaviour of transnational corporations often face a host of 
political concerns and economic interests (Rothe, 2010: 561; Snider and Bittle, 2011). And as 
demonstrated here, there are significant structural, legal, evidential, procedural and 
financial obstacles to implementing international frameworks for enforcement, even when 
motivation to enforce is high. Consequently, full criminal law enforcement is currently 
implausible. 
 
International anti-bribery frameworks 
 
Nation-states strive to promote their own economic and corporate interests. Unless they 
have key power advantages, creating an even playing field is important for those countries 
with corporations interested in exporting or investing overseas. In the 1970s, the US 
government faced internal criticism over the conduct of its corporations in relation to 
bribery of overseas officials and subsequently enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
1977 to address this, expecting that other jurisdictions would follow suit. This did not 
immediately occur, however, and it took two more decades before US pressures led the 
OECD to create their Anti-Bribery Convention 1997. This required key economic countries to 
create similar transnational bribery provisions at the national level. The UNCAC 2003 was 
more complex and organic in its creation and represented the interests of a wider number 
of stakeholders and jurisdictions. Germany and the UK ratified the OECD Convention in 
September 1998 and December 1998 respectively. At the time of writing, Germany has yet 
to ratify the UNCAC but signed it in December 2003. The UK ratified the UNCAC in February 
2006. The OECD and UN Conventions are global in scope, albeit the OECD Convention is 
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specifically targeted at those countries with the largest share of international exports. Other 
conventions and provisions exist at the EU level (most notably the Council of Europe and EU 
conventions and protocols - some of which preceded the UNCAC and OECD Convention). 
These contain similar provisions to, but are less influential than, the UNCAC and OECD 
Convention that this article focuses on. 
 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
 
The OECD Convention was the first and remains the only legally binding instrument focusing 
on the supply side of bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions 
and provides measures to make this effective. The Convention deals with what is termed 
‘active bribery’ in contrast to ‘passive bribery’. This means the focus is on the offence 
committed by the person who promises or gives a bribe. That said, the Convention does not 
use the term ‘active bribery’ to avoid creating the wrong impression that the briber always 
takes the initiative and the recipient is merely a passive victim (OECD, 1997: 14, paragraph 
1): it is often the case that the recipient will have induced or pressured the briber and thus 
be more ‘active’. The Convention seeks a ‘functional equivalence’ amongst the measures 
taken by the Parties to sanction bribery of foreign public officials. ‘Functional equivalence’ 
permits State Parties to implement any means they consider to be suitable providing they 
enable the requirements of Article 1 of the Convention (The Offence of Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials) to be met. Thus, anti-bribery enforcement measures in each jurisdiction do 
not require uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a Party’s legal systems). For 
pragmatic and political reasons, there are therefore no requirements for harmonisation of 
anti-bribery measures across jurisdictions, with ‘goals’ (e.g. reductions in bribery or 
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increased enforcement) being prioritised above ‘means’ (e.g. the use of corporate criminal 
liability in the UK but not Germany). This requires greater conceptual analysis of equivalence 
than mere technical copying would do. 
Both the UK and Germany are categorised as ‘active enforcers’ of the OECD 
Convention. This refers to those countries with a share of world exports over 2% and with at 
least 10 major cases on a cumulative basis, at least three of which were initiated in the last 
three years and resulted in substantial sanctions - these thresholds are arbitrary and are not 
premised on any logical foundation (it is unclear why the threshold is 10 major cases, for 
example). Data taken from the most recent TI Progress Report from 2012 indicate that in 
the period since the Convention came into force up until the end of 2011, Germany had 
concluded 176 cases (of which over 16 were ‘major’) while the UK had concluded 23 cases 
(all of which were ‘major’) up until August 2012.4 Despite the significant difference in 
figures, the enforcement rates of major cases and individual prosecutions have become 
more similar in recent years (the UK concluded its first case in 2008). 
 
The UN Convention against Corruption  
 
The UNCAC is the first global legally binding instrument in the fight against corruption. It 
requires the States Parties to implement numerous and detailed anti-bribery and corruption 
measures impacting upon their laws, institutions and practices. The purpose is to aid 
prevention, detection and sanctioning of corrupt practices and encourage cooperation. The 
Convention requires States Parties to establish a range of offences associated with 
corruption and attaches particular importance to prevention and the strengthening of 
international cooperation to combat corruption. It also includes ‘innovative and far-
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reaching’ provisions on asset recovery and technical assistance and implementation. It 
contains eight chapters and 71 articles, in comparison to the OECD Convention that is 
relatively short with 17 articles. The UNCAC, when compared to other conventions, is more 
detailed and extensive with its provisions and incorporates an extensive global reach: it was 
negotiated by representatives of more than a hundred countries from all regions while civil 
society organisations, such as TI, also had a significant role in this process. The UNCAC goes 
beyond the scope of the OECD Convention in numerous ways. For example, Articles 15 and 
16 require the criminalisation of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ bribery of national public officials and 
foreign public officials respectively. Amongst others, article 21 explicitly incorporates bribery 
in the private sector into the Convention whilst numerous other offences (for example, 
embezzlement, abuse of functions, etc.) not included in the OECD Convention are explicitly 
included in the UNCAC.  
 
The national level: legal frameworks and implementation of international conventions 
 
The above international conventions provide extensive anti-bribery and corruption 
frameworks. The external pressure on states to implement relevant legislation is great, but 
law creation also faces significant internal pressures. Both the UK and Germany have 
implemented stringent legal provisions for the regulation of transnational corporate bribery 
providing the enforcement authorities with legal frameworks to investigate and prosecute 
foreign bribery cases.  
 
The UK 
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The UK Bribery Act 2010 (UKBA) that came into force on 1 July 2011 is now the key piece of 
anti-corruption legislation in the UK. Prior to this (and analogous in some respects to fraud 
before the Fraud Act 2006), the legal system presented a somewhat complex and 
fragmented picture of bribery, with several overlapping laws covering specific corruption 
offences. Anti-bribery and corruption legislation was primarily provided under the 
Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 – 1906, with amendments from the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001. Current transnational corporate bribery cases are largely still 
being conducted in relation to offences under these acts. At the time of writing, no 
transnational corporate bribery cases have been brought under the UKBA. The UKBA, 
however, was developed following significant criticism and pressure at the international 
level and provides one of the most extensive national anti-bribery laws.  
The UKBA contains four distinct offences: the general offences of active (offering, 
promising) and passive (accepting, soliciting) bribery; the bribery of foreign officials (broad 
definition including a variety of state officials, for example, politicians, police officers, etc. 
and must be in the context of business commerce); and the failure of commercial 
organisations to prevent bribery (a form of strict liability making corporations criminally 
liable for the actions of their employees, subsidiaries, intermediaries (see below)). UK 
prosecutors are also able to use a variety of other criminal offences and legislation such as 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) that enables substantive bribery cases to be 
concluded in relation to money laundering offences, amongst others.  
 
Germany 
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The Anti-Corruption Act 1997 was the last measure to improve Germany’s criminal law that 
was solely initiated by German political actors (Wolf, 2006: 785). This Act formulated 
sections 331 – 338 of the German Criminal Code (GCC). Anti-bribery and corruption 
legislation is further supplemented by the EU Anti-Bribery Act and the Act on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1998 - this latter Act 
satisfies the requirements of the OECD Convention. The Bundestag has largely confined its 
implementation legislation to the minimum requirements of the respective international 
legal instruments, a policy that has led to legal inconsistencies (Wolf, 2006: 789). In 2006 the 
German Federal Ministry of Justice created a governmental draft of a Second Anti-
Corruption Act intended to bind various international conventions and provisions, including 
the UNCAC. At the time of writing, this new law has not been enacted. All national 
provisions on corruption related criminal offences can be located in the GCC, in addition to 
the abovementioned auxiliary laws. The German GCC distinguishes between Bestechung 
(active bribery for future or past actions that induced an official to breach their duties) and 
Bestechlichkeit (passive bribery for past and future actions that induced an official to breach 
their duties), and Vorteilsannahme (acceptance of an advantage or benefit for future or past 
actions that did not involve the official breaching their duty) and Vorteilsgewährung (giving 
of an advantage or benefit for future or past actions that did not involve the official 
breaching their duty). German prosecutors also utilise a variety of other criminal offences 
such as ‘fraud’ and ‘breach of trust’ to deal with substantive transnational bribery cases. 
 
Legal convergence 
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The impact of pressuring nation-states to implement international frameworks for 
enforcement has led to convergence and harmonisation of key legal provisions. Germany 
has yet to ratify the UNCAC but this relates to the requirement for the criminalisation of 
‘domestic bribery’, which has attracted opposition from German politicians.5 German 
authorities might regard it as consistent to respond to international obligations, but to 
regard their domestic legislation as their own business alone. Despite non-ratification, 
Germany nonetheless meets all the foreign bribery requirements of the UNCAC due to the 
similar requirements of the ratified OECD Convention. German laws therefore incorporate 
analogous provisions to that of the UK where ratification of UNCAC has taken place. For 
example, active and passive bribery, bribery of foreign officials, extraterritorial reach, 
amongst others, are all evident. In this sense, non-ratification of the UNCAC in Germany has 
not made any significant difference to the policy response and enforcement context when 
contrasted with the UK, although the ‘functional equivalence’ approach of the OECD 
Convention does enable significant differences to remain between the UK and Germany in 
the legal frameworks. However, non-ratification of the UNCAC may create difficulties in 
mutual legal assistance should German authorities require cooperation with those 
jurisdictions that have not ratified the OECD Convention. 
 
Enforcing the law 
 
The particular nature of transnational corporate bribery poses identical problems to both 
jurisdictions. Transnational corporate bribery is clandestine and frequently involves 
consenting actors whereby both parties benefit from the corrupt transaction. The lack of 
identifiable consequences (e.g. no direct victims or harms), the ‘invisibility’ of actors, their 
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relations and transactions due to the ambiguous nature of bribes (e.g. exchange of 
legitimate services) and the knowledge and power problems of the state ensuring corporate 
subsystems and their transactions remain difficult to access and understand (see Mayntz, 
1993; Gill, 2002), are common characteristics of the problem in the UK and Germany. The 
following section evidences how responding to such a complex crime encounters structural, 
legal, evidential, procedural and financial obstacles and thus influences the ability of nation-
states to enforce the international frameworks they have been pressured into 
implementing, even when resources and political will may be evident.  
 
 
Structural: centralised vs. decentralised enforcement systems 
 
Two diverse enforcement systems exist in the UK (centralised) and Germany (decentralised) 
which reflects geographical, historical and cultural factors but both reflect traditional 
‘command and control’ regulatory regimes (see Baldwin and Cave, 1999). In 2005 the 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) became the lead agency in the UK for investigating and 
prosecuting transnational bribery and corruption.6 Prior to this, these responsibilities were 
with an extraordinary number of state agencies including the SFO, the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service, the 43 local police forces (Metropolitan Police Service in particular), the 
City of London Police, the Ministry of Defence Police and the Companies Investigation 
Branch of the Department for Trade and Industry (now the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills). The SFO now has national jurisdiction (excluding Scotland) and 
receives support if and when required from the Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit of the City of 
London Police and the various local police forces. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is 
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also able to sanction regulated financial institutions for failures in anti-bribery and 
corruption compliance7 while the Ministry of Defence Police replaces the Overseas Anti-
Corruption Unit of the City of London Police if the case involves allegations against Ministry 
of Defence employees or defence contracts to which the Ministry of Defence is a party. 
Similarly, the Police Service for Northern Ireland replaces the Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit 
of the City of London Police if the case relates to Northern Ireland. The Crown Prosecution 
Service prosecutes any case not falling within the remit of the SFO, and Serious Organised 
Crime Agency has special investigatory powers to support SFO investigations and may also 
investigate a case if not accepted by the SFO.  
Within the sixteen German Bundesländer (federal states), there are around 110 
Staatsanwaltschaften (Public Prosecutor’s Offices). Within each Bundesland there are a 
number of public prosecutor’s offices, a Landeskriminalamt (State Criminal Investigation 
Office) and numerous Polizeipräsidien (Local Police Headquarters). The public prosecutors 
lead all transnational bribery and corruption cases and are supported by regional and local 
police during investigations. As in the UK, the German public prosecutor’s office is involved 
in investigation and prosecution throughout the case and often conducts interrogations, 
analysis of documents, etc. without police assistance – this dual role of investigation and 
prosecution is a key commonality in the policing of serious and complex crimes such as 
transnational bribery. The police only become involved when directed to do so by the public 
prosecutor, while the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office) can facilitate 
investigations at the national level. Corruption and bribery only began to be substantially 
prosecuted following the creation of the first Schwerpunktstaatsanwaltschaften 
(prosecutor’s offices with a special competence, in this case in the area of corruption). Not 
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all Bundesländer have such specialist offices, but all usually have specialist departments or 
units that deal exclusively with corruption and bribery.  
There are strengths and limitations of both systems. The UK’s centralised model 
enables a more consistent and coordinated regulatory approach. However, the SFO has 
modest personnel and funding for an agency with national jurisdiction and therefore applies 
discretionary ‘acceptance criteria’ to all cases from the pre-investigation stage.8 This results 
in only large, complex cases being taken on - it has never been the case in England that the 
authorities are obliged to prosecute all the offences that come to their attention (Spencer, 
2002: 161). In Germany, a more rigid legal framework exists which stipulates that 
prosecution of an offence is mandatory for public prosecutors and investigations must be 
commenced when sufficient suspicion arises (Juy-Birmann, 2002).  
Despite this formal contrast, there is little difference between the two jurisdictions 
in the use and availability of discretion to determine whether or not to investigate or 
prosecute transnational bribery cases as similar consideration is given to public interest, 
likelihood of conviction, available resources and prioritisation. Legal alternatives are also 
available in both jurisdictions while the innovative use of the statute of limitation in 
Germany (five years) is also used. Thus, much convergence is evident despite contrasting 
legal traditions. For example, cases involving ‘facilitation payments’ (‘grease payments’) are 
unlikely to be prosecuted by the SFO and are subsequently accommodated by enforcement 
agencies - focus is instead placed on corporations to eradicate such payments within and by 
their organisations over time. In Germany, levels of enforcement vary across the 
Bundesländer as the extent of funding, political will and prosecutorial and investigatory 
expertise differs in each state. Some Bundesländer are significantly more ‘enthusiastic’ and 
this can lead to public prosecutors in some jurisdictions preferring to keep ownership over 
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cases instead of passing them on to other authorities due to concerns that the case will not 
be intensively pursued. However, as responsibility lies with a multitude of actors and 
departments across the 16 Bundesländer, the central state is less able to impart one-sided 
and partial procedures. Centralised enforcement in Germany is impracticable due to the 
historical, geographical and cultural development of the federal states: each Bundesland has 
a number of small, medium and large cities and municipalities, each with decision-making 
powers with which the Bundesland, or even the central-state, cannot always interfere. This 
creates a number of obstacles to reorganising the system and poses concerns for 
representatives of intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD and GRECO who are 
unable to ensure harmonised enforcement throughout Germany.  
 
Legal: corporate criminal liability 
 
Corporate criminal liability determines whether ‘legal persons’ (that is, corporations) can be 
prosecuted under the criminal law in the same way that ‘natural persons’ (individual 
persons) can be prosecuted although there is often some relationship between the two:  
 
[w]hen offences by individuals occur in a corporate context, it may be because the company’s 
policies, culture and ethos authorize, encourage, condone or tolerate the illegal behaviour…That the 
individual was committing the offence on behalf of a company provides a handy rationalization for 
the crime.’ (Gobert, 2011: 154)  
 
Corporate criminal liability in the UK has traditionally required courts to locate the 
corporate mind for purposes of assessing mens rea. English judges found the ‘company’s 
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mind’ in the mind of persons who could be ‘identified’ with the company for legal purposes 
(Gobert and Punch, 2003: 38). This historical focus on the individual has caused the legal 
mind to struggle with locating mens rea in an aggregate entity (Punch, 2011: 111). This has 
remained a key difficulty in the UK: 
 
I mean the major problem remains that we have horrendously bad corporate liability laws. If 
companies are a little bit clever and export their corruption to foreign commission agents they can 
distance themselves sufficiently far from it so as to keep the controlling mind well out…The only 
reason smaller companies like Mabey and Johnson
9
 got done is the directors are actually doing the 
work - the controlling mind -, are actively involved in the work (Interview with UK prosecutor) 
 
The difficulty in locating the ‘controlling mind’ remains for the general offences of 
active and passive bribery (this influences the increased use of civil approaches in the UK). 
However, under the corporate offence of ‘failure to prevent bribery’ (section 7 UKBA) a 
corporation can also be held criminally liable for acts of bribery by its associated persons 
(employees, subsidiaries, intermediaries, sales agents, and so on)  that are carried out on 
behalf of the corporation. Previous to the UKBA, and as above, corporations could only be 
held criminally liable if it could be proved that the ‘corporate mind’ (i.e. a board member or 
executive) had a direct role in the bribery. However should the UK corporation have 
‘adequate’ anti-bribery procedures, policies and cultures in place, this may provide a legal 
defence to prosecution. The inclusion of a form of strict liability into the UKBA reflects the 
argument that ‘[t]he organization often provides the motive, opportunity and means; it is 
the scene of crime; and the offences can be committed across time and in diverse locations 
depending on the structure of the company’ (Punch, 2011: 110) (emphasis added). 
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However, such strict liability removes the requirement of intent and may reinforce such 
behaviour as ‘mala prohibita’ rather than ‘mala in se’. 
Corporations in Germany cannot be held criminally liable. The distinction between 
‘legal persons’ and ‘natural persons’ has more meaning here as what a corporation does 
cannot be interpreted as an ‘act’ in German Penal Law (Hefendehl, 2001): 
 
 The German system is based on the principle of guilt, and only someone considered a natural person 
 can have guilt. A legal entity is an empty body and only the person able to act for the entity can 
 realise this guilt. (Interview with German lawyer) 
 
Consequently, only ‘natural persons’ can be held criminally liable. The responsibility 
of legal persons and associations of persons is regulated by the law for violations of good 
order, or in other words, regulatory offences (Rogall, 2011: 334). Thus, liability may be 
imposed on corporations by state authorities only for administrative offences 
(Ordnungswidrigkeiten) which result only in administrative fines (Geldbuβen). The 
prerequisite is that as a result of the criminal offence, the company’s duties have been 
violated or the company has been enriched or intended to be enriched. Additionally, in 
cases where a company’s management has taken inadequate supervisory measures 
required to prevent bribery, the company may be held liable. For example, section 130 
‘Violation of obligatory supervision in firms and enterprises’ of the Administrative Offences 
Act (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten) relates to violations of supervisory duties as a result 
of failures by senior officers of the company to supervise employees if their actions led to 
criminal or administrative offences. This offence brings a maximum fine of €1m plus 
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unlimited confiscation of profits made from the bribery. However, a lack of corporate 
criminal liability is not necessarily a problem for intergovernmental organisations: 
 
I don’t really care whether Germany has a genuinely criminal concept or a para-criminal concept; that 
doesn’t matter very much. I find a million Euros [maximum administrative fine for the offence] is too 
little and in the [name of organisation] context, it is on the lower side. I am not unhappy in the way 
that they apply it - on corruption they have done quite a lot in the meantime. (Interview with 
intergovernmental organisation representative) 
 
This reflects the ‘functional equivalence’ position of intergovernmental organisations 
that places emphasis on successful outcomes of bribery cases as opposed to harmonisation 
of the mechanisms adopted to investigate and prosecute although some criticism of the 
penalties is evident. While such divergence at the national level may be acceptable by 
intergovernmental organisations, it can potentially create difficulties in Mutual Legal 
Assistance (Rechtshilfe (MLA)). In other words, some jurisdictions may be unable to assist 
where there is no criminal law element involved, and difficulties in terms of debarment - 
Article 45 of the EU Procurement Directive10 requires mandatory debarment of corporations 
criminally prosecuted for bribery, but this is not possible in Germany. Although judges are 
able to debar German corporations independently, this has yet to occur. This creates the 
potential for an ‘uneven playing field’. 
 
Evidential: transnational investigations 
 
Evidential difficulties are most notable in two ways: (i) the burden of proof when attempting 
to criminally prosecute a corporation and (ii) obtaining evidence from other jurisdictions. A 
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recent example of these difficulties in the UK can be seen in the case involving Oxford 
Publishing Ltd (OPL), a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxford University Press (OUP). OPL 
received sums generated through corrupt behaviour in Kenya and Tanzania and on 3 July 
2012 were given a Civil Recovery Order. The rationale for not pursuing criminal prosecution 
were that (i) key material obtained through the investigation was not in an evidentially 
admissible format for a criminal prosecution and that (ii) witnesses in any such prosecution 
would be in overseas jurisdictions and are considered unlikely to assist or co-operate with a 
criminal investigation in the UK.11  
Considering such obstacles along with the difficulties of locating the ‘controlling 
mind’ of a corporation, as above, demonstrates key limits to prosecution policies. For 
example, determining accountability and/or proving a director or executive of a corporation 
was involved in the bribery is complex. The size and scope of a corporation influences 
director accountability as devolved decision making processes, issues of implied consent, 
‘corporate cultures’ and various other structural complexities within MNCs make links 
between a corporation’s and director’s actions difficult to detect and prove. For example, 
top-down pressure from high-level executives and managers to maximise turnover and 
profits may create a culture that encourages or legitimises bribery but evidencing the 
relationship between executive pressure and acts of bribery by employees cannot easily be 
proved. This is further complicated within corporations where various levels of hierarchy 
and responsibility are evident or where foreign subsidiaries and associates are involved. 
Obtaining evidence to support investigations for both the purposes of ascertaining 
individual and corporate liability and for investigations generally is further complicated by 
the transnational nature of corporate bribery. For example, how does a UK/German 
prosecutor obtain evidence in a bribery case when the bribes were given by an agent based 
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in African country A, who was employed by company Z that is based in Asian country B, and 
who is connected to the UK/Germany as it is the subsidiary of company Y based in 
London/Frankfurt (country C)? These distant relationships between agents and clients, the 
high level of secrecy and privacy or lack of direct victims to report, and differing laws in 
different countries create major problems - the nature of global business transactions 
creates a significant barrier to effective regulation and enforcement (Gibbs et al, 2010: 550). 
Both UK and German prosecutors are faced with these difficulties. It may be that proving 
the transaction is more straightforward than proving what the benefit was. For example, 
money changing hands in unusual circumstances or wrongly accounted for transactions in 
difficult to trace bank accounts using front companies are usually recorded somewhere. 
Proving the benefit, or the trade-off, is more complex, as it may be an inducement or a 
reward with no written record, making a clear understanding and a fortiori proof of that 
understanding more difficult. Gathering evidence on such cases requires MLA. 
Investigators and prosecutors, in all transnational corporate bribery cases, must 
cooperate with agencies in other jurisdictions in order to ascertain information and 
evidence but the efficacy of MLA varies significantly in different countries. For example, 
although the German authorities have excellent relations with neighbouring countries such 
as Austria and Switzerland, difficulties often emerge further afield. As one German 
investigator explained: 
 
With some countries it fails due to their biography, with some due to the resources as the capacity is 
simply not there. Sometimes it is the case that there’s no evident will to assist, and then there are 
those countries where you can really say that there are national authorities with which you’re not 
even allowed to try to cooperate. It varies a lot. (Interview with German investigator) 
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Difficulties exist even between the UK and Germany, as while they have worked 
effectively together, language difficulties can emerge (German prosecutors are often fluent 
in English but this is less frequently the case further down the enforcement regime and the 
SFO has minimal foreign language expertise) which requires employing interpreters and 
translators at high cost. One UK investigator talked of some individuals advocating 
automated translation but he (understandably) did not appear convinced about the 
standard of English that came out of this. Further difficulties arise when requesting 
assistance from developing countries, in other words, from those countries with inadequate 
anti-bribery and corruption enforcement systems and those with insufficient resources to 
ratify international enforcement frameworks. 
Some countries have been notoriously difficult to obtain information from making 
MLA time consuming. The anonymity involved in international commerce via numerous 
financial institutions and through difficult to access jurisdictions causes great difficulties for 
regulation (Elliot, 2009). Some jurisdictions, for example Lichtenstein, Switzerland and 
Luxembourg, amongst others, have traditionally had very stringent secrecy laws and 
provisions in relation to the banking system, making obtaining information about financial 
transactions and bank accounts more difficult. One UK investigator gave the example of an 
individual in Switzerland having seventeen separate opportunities to appeal against material 
being transferred to the UK. Other countries may have different procedures, for example, 
only cooperating via formal written requests rather than giving prior information via a 
simple telephone call, as it goes against their legal system based on Commissions Rogatoires 
between judicial authorities, not the police. In another case, the French authorities 
complained that a search conducted for them in the UK was of no use because all the UK 
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authority had done was send them the original documents that were confiscated – as no 
investigator’s report was attached outlining the nature of the MLA request, they were not 
able to use it under their system. This can make cooperation long-winded despite speed 
being of paramount importance in some cases. However, one UK investigator suggested 
that in the view of other European countries, the UK does not have a good reputation for 
MLA – a view substantiated by some German prosecutors and investigators (See also Levi 
(1987) showing this is not a recent phenomenon). Even more difficult is cooperation with 
those countries that have no anti-bribery and corruption authorities or no political will to 
assist. These factors reinforce limited enforcement models at the national level and the 
difficulties in implementing international frameworks for enforcement. However, recent 
global settlements between the UK and the US, and between Germany and the US, have 
demonstrated how MLA can work effectively and attempt to address this transnational 
difficulty.12 
 
Procedural: prosecution policy 
 
Conducting transnational investigations and prosecutions is resource intensive. Criminal 
prosecution is extremely expensive and time-consuming due to the high costs of 
investigation to meet the substantial evidential and procedural requirements (as above), 
due to the costs of recruiting external counsel and prosecutors for large complex cases, and 
due to the ability of corporations to employ technical and expert legal teams to defend 
them all of which lower the likelihood of conviction. Conversely, civil solutions are more cost 
effective, with corporations often covering the costs of investigation. Civil solutions enable 
the prosecutorial authorities to conclude an increased number of cases as there is no 
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requirement to prove a criminal offence and the burden of proof is lower therefore 
increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. This in turn enables the authorities to 
extend their reach. Civil solutions to this can take several forms: financial settlements and 
fines; restitution via Civil Recovery Orders that include the amount of the unlawful property 
(for example, often profits from contracts won), and investigatory and prosecutorial costs. 
In relation to the demand for resources and the use of civil solutions for overseas bribery 
cases, one UK prosecutor stated: 
 
…that doesn’t mean that they are any less criminal [companies that bribe compared to ‘conventional 
criminals’], it just means that you are trying to bring them to justice in a way that doesn’t sap all of 
your resource because obviously we are having our budgets cut quite drastically. So it is an extremely 
efficient way if they come to you and report and then correct the problem which is part of the 
solution, isn’t it. (Interview with UK prosecutor) 
 
In the current economic climate, particularly in the UK, available resources are 
influencing the adoption of more cost-effective approaches. The SFO has had its budget 
reduced in recent years. In Germany, resources are more widely available but the 
decentralised system results in some prosecutors being better equipped than others. Non-
criminal approaches may also be preferred due to the risk of debarment under the 
abovementioned EU Directive that requires mandatory debarment of any corporation found 
guilty of a corruption offence. The financial consequences of debarment to a country’s 
economy can be significant, causing tension for states between considering national 
economic interest and ensuring the Rule of Law.  
Thus, UK and German investigators and prosecutors, as well as representatives of 
intergovernmental organisations, accept the reality of financial, evidential and procedural 
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restraints but this shift towards civil solutions is also ideological and symbolic as these actors 
suggest that much corporate, economic crime requires negotiation and persuasion rather 
than criminal prosecution as part of a more dynamic approach. For example, new regulatory 
models include ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), ‘smart regulation’ 
(Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998), problem-solving regulation (Sparrow, 2008), ‘meta-
regulation’ (Parker, 2002), market based regulation (Gill, 2000; Edwards and Gill, 2002), the 
‘governance triangle’ (Abbott and Snidal, 2006), ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Braithwaite, 2008) 
and ‘really responsive risk-based regulation’ (Black and Baldwin, 2010) while there has been 
recent focus on regulators as ‘sociological citizens’ (Silbey et al., 2009; Silbey, 2011). 
Multiple common themes can be seen throughout these approaches. For example, the need 
for a varied set of sanctions and strategies including both enforcement and self-regulatory 
mechanisms, the necessity of ‘negotiated relationships’ between the regulators and 
regulatees, the reflexivity, responsiveness and agency of the regulators, and the 
involvement of non-state actors and agencies. As Haines notes:  
 
This literature places the regulator within a broad governance framework where the enforcement of 
rules within narrow prescriptive frameworks is eschewed in preference for policy mixes, combining 
instruments, third-party actors, and enforcement regimes that collectively can both “push” and “pull” 
(Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998: 259) regulatees into a reflexive appreciation of the goals the 
regulator wants to achieve and lead them to act in a diligent manner to bring the goals to fruition’ 
(Haines, 2011: 118-119)  
 
In line with these new regulatory models, innovative and parsimonious approaches 
have emerged within the regulatory landscape of transnational corporate bribery. ‘Hybrid 
mechanisms’ such as the use of self-reporting, self-cleaning13 and self-investigation, 
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amongst others, have formed part of civil settlements. An SFO press release described this 
new approach as being ‘more effective and costing less’ and resulting in the SFO becoming 
‘stronger, faster and leaner’14. However, in October 2012, the new Director, David Green, 
attempted to ‘toughen’ the SFO’s stance towards bribery by removing previous guidance on 
self-reporting that indicated likely incentives to corporations and by reaffirming the role of 
the SFO as a prosecutor – given the difficulties to prosecution outlined above, this may 
prove to be rhetorical. However, the likely introduction of Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
(DPAs) in 2013 in the UK may provide the SFO with a further innovative mechanism that can 
enable the SFO to both reinforce its prosecutorial role while continuing to shift towards 
‘negotiated justice’. In Germany prosecutors are already adopting non-prosecution 
agreements as a way of addressing evidential difficulties. Given the multi-jurisdictional 
nature of overseas bribery, prosecutors may also attempt to offer finality to the corporation 
by reaching global settlements with other jurisdictions. It has been argued that such shifts 
away from criminal prosecution may provide a more suitable enforcement framework: 
Khanna concludes that 
 
…if we start with the notion that corporate wrongdoing is not sufficiently deterred at present, then 
we would want to argue for curtailing corporate criminal liability and increasing the focus on 
corporate civil liability and managerial liability. This raises serious questions about how we regulate 
this area. (2004: 141, emphasis in original) 
 
Khanna’s argument is based on the premise that corporate crime legislation may be 
the preferred outcome for corporate interests as it (i) satisfies public outcry but (ii) imposes 
low costs on businesses, and (iii) therefore avoids legislative and judicial responses that are 
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more harmful to their interests and sometimes deflects criminal liability away from 
managers and executives and onto corporations (2004: 95). However, Wells does not 
believe anyone seriously suggests private law as the only option as even Khanna emphasises 
the importance of public enforcement (2011: 15). Shifts towards non-criminal alternatives 
may also reduce the stigma associated with such criminal behaviour and fail to satisfy public 
demand for social fairness and retribution, creating an image of such offences as ‘mala 
prohibita’ rather than ‘mala in se’. 
 
Implications for the policy response 
 
The complex organisation of corporate bribery presents obstacles to prosecution and 
conviction, rendering criminal law enforcement implausible in the current control landscape 
– the difficulties when criminally prosecuting corporations, the shift towards civil 
settlements and negotiation, the need to use resources effectively, the evidential burdens 
of transnational investigations, etc. inhibit the policy response of the UK and Germany to 
address transnational bribery. Although some regulation is possible, the enforcement 
capacities of responsible agencies and actors cannot meet even the most conservative 
estimate of the ‘need’ or ‘demand’ for prosecutions, even more so in times of austerity. 
Understanding these limitations may assist policymakers, legislators and agents of 
control in improving current practices. Granted that there may be a demand for punishing 
bribery as just deserts and social fairness, irrespective of the deterrent impact, other 
approaches are possible either as substitutes or as supplements. Shifting analytical focus 
onto the modus operandi of how those incidents of bribery (that do come to the attention 
of the authorities and are successfully prosecuted) have been organised and onto the 
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particular technical and social characteristics and relations of transnational bribery would 
supplement more reactive policies. For example, white-collar crime reduction has been 
analysed through an ‘opportunity perspective’ approach, the tools of which are 
predominantly situational crime prevention, routine activities theory and crime pattern 
theory (see Benson et al., 2009; Benson and Simpson, 2009). Based on the ‘crime triangle’ 
(i.e. motivated offender, opportunity and capable guardians), the propensity to commit 
offences is assumed and analytical focus is placed on ‘opportunity structures’. By identifying 
the features of the immediate ‘situations’ within which white-collar crimes take place and 
the processes involved, it is possible to intervene and reduce (or perhaps displace) such 
crimes. Understanding the ‘technical’ dimensions of corporate bribery is clearly important 
for enforcement authorities. However, such approaches must be supplemented with an 
understanding of the ‘social’ dimensions (i.e. the necessary and contingent relations (see 
Edwards and Hughes, 2005) of corporate bribery and the nature of these relations in 
different geo-historical contexts). Intervention strategies incorporating both dimensions 
guided by risk-based assessments of potentially corruptible markets, sectors, corporations 
and individuals can strategically shape the enforcement response. For example, drawing on 
Levi’s process model of transnational ‘serious crimes’ (2007: 781), enforcement agencies 
could aim to develop intervention points in relation to the following processes and 
characteristics, amongst others, that incorporate both technical and social dimensions and 
risk assessments: 
 
1. How are the finances for bribes obtained? For example, how do legitimate 
corporations channel funds for the creation of slush funds and what are the 
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concealment practices involved? E.g. use of front companies; fake conferences to 
generate funds; inflated prices. 
2. How are bribe payers and receivers recruited (e.g. internal/external, 
domestic/overseas to the corporation) and how do they develop the 
expertise/technical ability to develop bribery schemes? Which criteria identify 
potential intermediaries and bribe receivers e.g. politicians, state officials? 
3. Which corporate mechanisms and tools are utilised and necessary to be able to 
bribe? E.g. bank accounts in difficult to reach jurisdictions. How are the proceeds of 
bribes concealed and converted (i.e. money laundering) from the various authorities 
(e.g. law enforcement, tax authorities) and what are the particular legal/structural 
contexts that enable this? 
4. Which jurisdictions, which industries/sectors (e.g. construction, pharmaceutical, 
manufacturing) and which corporate employees (e.g. sales agents, middle-level 
managers) are at highest risk of bribery and how can this risk be located within 
specific geo-historical contexts?  
5. Which external and internal actors are required to be complicit for bribery to remain 
undetected and how are these relations developed over time? E.g. external 
accountants, high-level management. 
6. How might bribe givers neutralise law enforcement responses and/or ‘capable 
guardians’? 
 
Understanding the necessary and contingent relations of bribery enables key 
vulnerabilities in the above processes to be determined for strategic interventions, even if it 
may not be possible in the short term politically to close off those loopholes. Law 
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enforcement agencies, however, are under pressure to produce ‘results’, usually in the form 
of prosecutions, in order to ensure they maintain their existence and function. Shifts 
towards prevention and disruption reduce the number of measureable results but may also 
contradict statutory remits, most notably in Germany: 
 
Prevention is something that the public prosecutor doesn’t do. We only operate in terms of 
repression…By law we are explicitly a prosecutorial authority. We have no mandate for prevention. 
(Interview with German prosecutor) 
 
However, law enforcement agencies must incorporate more innovative intervention 
strategies beyond traditional reactive enforcement mechanisms of criminal prosecution if 
the behaviour of corporations is to be changed. ‘Hybrid mechanisms’ such as self-reporting 
by corporations and self-cleaning, as above, are a key shift in this direction. Other potential 
practices such as improved whistleblowing provisions (although American-style financial 
rewards for ‘high-quality’ tips as with the Dodd-Frank Act may contradict and undermine 
corporate anti-bribery policies) and certification schemes (providing these do not conflict 
with the ability to prosecute and sanction corporations) require consideration but such 
mechanisms are shaped within the constraints of legal cultures and jurisdictional 
boundaries. There is, however, much scope for innovation at the multi-jurisdictional, 
transnational level - coordinated risk-based intervention strategies between anti-corruption 
agencies and actors in different jurisdictions offers much potential but remains politically 
and legally difficult. Intergovernmental organisations such as the GRECO, the OECD and the 
UN do generate themed reports across jurisdictions and provide frameworks for 
coordinated approaches but joint prevention/proactive exercises are not institutionally 
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possible except via industry initiatives. For example, UK and German authorities could in 
coordination target high-risk sectors (e.g. manufacturing, defence) or high-risk jurisdictions 
(e.g. corporations operating in a particular country where corruption remains problematic) 
in raids, but there is currently no obvious prevention mechanism or legislative powers for so 
doing in advance of criminal complaints.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
International frameworks for enforcement pressure nation-states to sign and ratify their 
requirements leading to implementation at the national level. Comparison of two 
theoretically comparable anti-corruption systems, the UK and Germany, enables significant 
insights into the impact of these international legal frameworks at the national level. First, 
such frameworks lead to legal convergence at the national level in relation to specific 
provisions accounting for bribery of foreign officials. Thus, harmonisation of the law is 
evident (despite Germany not having ratified the UNCAC). However, significant differences 
remain in these jurisdictions. Second, the enforcement of such legal frameworks at the 
operational level is the key issue. Whether centralised or decentralised and irrespective of 
other differing characteristics (for example, corporate criminal liability) enforcement 
systems at the national level face significant difficulties. The moral and socio-economic 
harms of corruption have led concerned parties to focus on law enforcement and other 
control mechanisms but criminal justice mechanisms have not proven to be easy, even 
when motivation to enforce is high. The law provides a normative framework within which 
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certain activities have been condemned. The criminal law framework therefore remains 
significant for prosecutors for its symbolic and (potentially) deterrent effect in order for the 
state (i) to negotiate regulation with corporations and (ii) to demonstrate to the various 
publics at the national, regional and international levels that it is actively enforcing the law 
against corporations that bribe overseas.  
Law enforcement, however, faces structural, legal, evidential, procedural and 
financial obstacles. The ‘functional equivalence’ approach of intergovernmental 
organisations enables diversity in the ‘means’ adopted providing the ‘goals’ (in other words, 
the successful conclusion of bribery cases) are met. This can be seen in relation to corporate 
criminal liability that is legally available in the UK but not in Germany. That said, other 
obstacles (for example, high burden of proof and financial costs of criminal prosecution) 
and/or ideologies (for example, regulatory approaches favouring compliance and persuasion 
rather than prosecution of corporations) have led to convergence in the regulatory 
approaches of these two jurisdictions. For example, corporations bribing overseas are likely 
to be able to negotiate civil solutions (to criminal behaviours) that incorporate financial 
penalties and more innovative mechanisms such as self-cleaning, monitoring and 
introducing adequate compliance systems to reduce the likelihood of future bribery. Thus, 
responding to transnational corporate bribery using international frameworks for 
enforcement, while legally sound, is not entirely practicable as difficulties emerge that 
hinder the full use of these legal provisions. 
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Notes 
 
1
 The UK-Saudi Arabia Al-Yamamah arms deal involved allegations of bribes paid to Saudi Officials by BAE 
totalling more than £1bn. An SFO investigation was halted in 2006 following government pressure. Tony Blair 
alluded to national security fears. In 2010, the SFO agreed a ‘plea-bargain’ with BAE in relation to other 
accusations of bribery in Tanzania, although BAE admitted only to relatively minor accounting offences and not 
bribery. The Siemens scandal involved a system of slush funds used to pay bribes to win overseas contracts. To 
date, Siemens has paid a total of €2.5bn to various agencies in administrative fines while a number of 
managers were convicted. 
2
 See Transparency International’s discussion of ‘costs of corruption’: 
http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorr4  (accessed 6 September 2012) 
3
 Although the ‘UK’ is used, this article refers specifically to England and Wales, and Northern Ireland – 
Scotland is not included here as it constitutes a separate jurisdiction in relation to transnational corporate 
bribery (and other offences). 
4
 Full report available at: 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2012_exportingcorruption_oecdprogress_en?mode=windo
w&printButtonEnabled=false&shareButtonEnabled=false&searchButtonEnabled=false&backgroundColor=%23
222222 (accessed 6 September 2012) 
5
 For discussion see - GRECO (2009) Third Round Evaluation on Germany (see paragraphs 37 et seqq.  and 106 
et seqq.): 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3%282009%293_Germany_One_E
N.pdf (accessed 6 September 2012) 
6
 See ‘Revised Memorandum Of Understanding On Implementing Part 12 Of The Anti-terrorism, Crime And 
Security Act 2001’: http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2008/DEP2008-0269.pdf (accessed 6 
September 2012) 
7
 In the Aon Ltd case, the company was fined for failing to take reasonable care to establish and maintain 
effective systems and controls to counter the risks of bribery and corruption. FSA press release: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/004.shtml (accessed 6 September 2012) 
8
 SFO criteria:  
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/fraud/report-it-in-confidenceanonymously/serious-fraud-office-%28sfo%29-
criteria.aspx (accessed 6 September 2012) 
9
 Mabey and Johnson, a supplier of steel bridging, pleaded guilty to bribing overseas officials in relation to 
public contracts - SFO press release: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-
2009/mabey--johnson-ltd-sentencing-.aspx (accessed 6 September 2012) 
10
 Full text of the Directive: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0018:En:HTML (accessed 6 September 2012) 
11
 SFO press release: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/oxford-
publishing-ltd-to-pay-almost-19-million-as-settlement-after-admitting-unlawful-conduct-in-its-east-african-
operations.aspx (accessed 6 September 2012) 
12
 The Innospec case involved a global settlement between US and UK authorities; the Siemens case involved 
intense cooperation between the Munich prosecutors and US authorities.  
13
 Self-cleaning involves clarification of the relevant facts and circumstances; repair of the damage caused; 
personnel measures; and, structural and organisational measures by the corporation (see Arrowsmith, et al., 
2009) 
14
 SFO press release: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2011/serious-
fraud-office---more-effective-and-costing-less.aspx (accessed 6 September 2012) 
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